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In Proving a Physician's Negligence, Reliance on the
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Must Be Accompanied
by Expert Testimony Regarding a Physician's
Applicable Standard of Care and the Breach of that
Standard: Toogood v. Rogal
TORTS - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - RES IPSA LOQUITUR -
REQUIREMENT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY - The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case for medical malpractice, despite the use of res ipsa loquitur,
expert medical testimony must be offered to establish the physi-
cian's standard of care and the breach of that standard.
Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A.2d 1140 (Pa. 2003).
Kevin Toogood ("Toogood") injured his head, jaw, back, and
shoulder in an automobile accident that occurred in 1992.1 To re-
ceive treatment for persistent jaw pain, Toogood began to visit a
dentist, Dr. Rogal, in September of 1993.2 These visits took place
at The Pain Center, a multi-disciplinary medical center,' where
Toogood also received paravertebral nerve block injections 4 from
Dr. Stone, a consulting anesthesiologist, to combat severe back
pain.5 Dr. Stone administered four paravertebral nerve block in-
jections on December 13, 1993, which caused Toogood to experi-
1. Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Pa. 2003). Toogood's pain, despite being
treated by multiple physicians and powerful medication, persisted. See Toogood v. Rogal,
764 A.2d 552, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), rev'd, 824 A.2d 1140 (Pa. 2003). As a result of the
automobile accident,Toogood's internal chest anatomy was distorted. Joint Brief for Appel-
lants at 5; see also Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A-2d 1140 (Pa. 2003).
2. Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Pa. 2003).
3. Toogood v. Rogal, 764 A.2d 552, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). Primarily owned by Dr.
Rogal, the Pain Center provides various forms of patient care. Id. During each weekly
visit, Toogood received preliminary evaluations and treatment from employees of The Pain
Center. Brief for Appellee at 2; see also Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A.2d 1140 (Pa. 2003).
4. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1143. "A paravertebral nerve block is an injection of a sub-
stance into a nerve along the vertebral column to arrest the passage of the nervous im-
pulse." Id. at 1143 n.2 (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 178, 1031 (26th ed. 1995));
see also STEDMAN'S, 214, 903, 1315 (27th ed. 2000).
5. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1143. During Toogood's initial visits to The Pain Center, Dr.
Rogal gave Toogood injections in the face, neck and head. Brief for Appellee at 3. During
subsequent appointments at The Pain Center, Toogood was introduced to Dr. Stone, who
gave Toogood cortisone shots throughout the fall of 1993. Id.
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ence pain and difficulties in breathing.6 After remaining at The
Pain Center for a short period of time, Toogood drove himself
home.7 At home, Toogood collapsed and was taken to The Chester
County Hospital.8 Dr. Dellevigne, the general surgeon at the hos-
pital who treated Toogood, diagnosed and repaired a pneumot-
hohrax.9 Toogood fully recovered from the procedure, but filed a
complaint against Dr. Rogal, The Pain Center, and Dr. Stone
(hereinafter "Rogal Defendants") on February 21, 1996.1 Prior to
being deposed, Dr. Stone, and his son Richard Stone, a nurse
anesthetist, who was the only other person in the room while the
injections were administered, died." Prior to trial, Dr. Stone's es-
tate made a verbal request for summary judgment, due to Too-
good's failure to timely file his medical expert's report. 2 The mo-
tion was not granted due to Toogood's assertion that he could es-
tablish a prima facie case of negligence by applying the doctrine of
6. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1143. The fourth and last injection administered by Dr. Stone
on December 13, 1993 was in a comparatively lower location on Toogood's back than any
previous injection. Brief for Appellee at 3.
7. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1143. While driving from The Pain Center to his home, Too-
good continued to have trouble breathing, and was forced to pull off the road to recover his
breath. Brief for Appellee at 4.
8. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1143. Toogood's mother drove him to the Chester County
Hospital emergency room, and an immediate X-Ray was ordered after emergency room
personnel listened to Toogood's lung. Brief for Appellee at 4.
9. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1143. A pneumothohrax, commonly called a collapsed lung,
involves the "presence of air or gas in the pleural cavity," which can impair respiratory
function. See STEDMAN'S, 1412 (27th ed. 2000). Pneumothohrax means technically "air in
the chest." Toogood v. Rogal, 764 A.2d 552, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (citing Earlin v.
Cravetz, 399 A.2d 783 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)). Medically it is a term used to describe a
condition when the lung collapses because air is present in the cavity outside the lung.
Earlin, 399 A.2d at 785 n.1. The lungs are encased in an envelope-like-sac, called the pleu-
ral cavity, which is a vacuum. Id. It is necessary to maintain the vacuum to sustain the
mechanics of respiration. Id. Anything breaking the "seal" will cause the lung to collapse.
Id.
10. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1143. Initially, claims of negligence and battery were as-
serted against Dr. Stone, and claims of direct and vicarious liability were asserted against
Dr. Rogal. Id. Ultimately, Toogood withdrew his claims of direct liability against Dr. Stone
and Dr. Rogal, and only moved against the Rogal Defendants on the basis of vicarious li-
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res ipsa loquitur."3 The case was allowed to proceed to trial on
that issue alone.
1 4
On July 24, 1997, as a result of the deaths of Dr. Stone and his
son, Dr. Stone's estate filed a motion for summary judgment.15
The motion was uncontested, resulting in the dismissal of all
claims against Dr. Stone, with the exception of a cross-claim for
contribution made by Dr. Rogal."6 At the conclusion of the trial,
the jury was given the case with a res ipsa loquitur instruction.
17
On October 23, 1998, the jury rendered a verdict favoring Toogood
in the amount of $465,000.18 Post trial motions for a new trial
were filed by the defendants; however, by Order entered on April
20, 1999, the trial court rejected their arguments.19 On appeal, the
Superior Court affirmed, concluding the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur to be an appropriate jury instruction.0 The Superior Court
also found that the trial judge properly granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Dr. Stone based on the Dead Man's Act.21
13. Id. Literally translated, the doctrine states that the occurrence of the accident
spoke for itself. Id. at 1145. Toogood's argument was based on his opinion that a pneu-
mothohrax, as a result of performing a paravertebral nerve block in an individual with a
distorted chest anatomy, was a simplistic matter and it did not require expert testimony on
the issue of negligence. Joint Brief for Appellants at 6-7.
14. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1143.
15. Joint Brief for Appellants at 6. Dr. Stone's motion was premised on the facts that
Toogood did not provide expert medical testimony needed to satisfy a prima facie case of
medical negligence, and "since Toogood was an incompetent witness against Dr. Stone
under the Dean Man's Act, 42 P.S. § 5930 (1975), he could not testify adverse to the interest
of the late Dr. Stone." Id.
16. Toogood, 824 A-2d at 1143-44. Despite the court's order, premised on the Dead
Man's Act, which precluded any adverse testimony against Dr. Stone, his estate acknowl-
edged that it could not contradict Toogood's claim that Dr. Stone gave the injection which
led to the current litigation. Toogood v. Rogal, 764 A.2d 552, 555 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
17. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1144. See infra note 30, and accompanying text. At trial,
Toogood himself and his treating physician, Dr. Dellevigne, testified; however, neither was
asked or brought up the issue of medical negligence. Joint Brief for Appellants at 7. At
trial, the defense offered no witnesses. Brief of Appellee at 7.
18. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1144.
19. Id. The Rogal Defendants argued, inter alia: 1) it was error to submit the case to
the jury sans expert evidence establishing medical negligence; and 2) it was inappropriate
for the trial judge to let the case proceed against the principal, Dr. Rogal, when his agent,
Dr. Stone was previously dismissed on the merits of a motion for summary judgment. Joint
Brief for Appellants at 7.
20. Toogood, 764 A.2d at 556. The Superior Court relied upon the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's decision in Hightower-Warren v. Silk, 698 A.2d 52 (Pa. 1997). See id. In
Hightower-Warren, the plaintiff correctly invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur after
suffering injuries to his vocal cords during thyroid surgery. See Id.
21. Toogood, 764 A.2d at 559. See also supra note 18. The Superior Court noted that
Dr. Rogal had confused a valid defense of immunity with the defense of release and satis-
faction and "evidenced a profound misapprehension of the nature of the vicarious liability
of a principal for the tortious acts of his agent." Id.
397
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On March 19, 2002, the petition for Allowance of Appeal to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was granted.22 The appeal was lim-
ited to the question of whether the trial court erred in failing to
grant the Rogal Defendants'2 3 motion for nonsuit due to the ab-
sence of expert testimony regarding medical malpractice.24 With
Justice Newman writing for the majority, the Superior Court's
finding was reversed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court con-
cluded that expert testimony was required in all medical malprac-
tice actions.25
The rationale behind Justice Newman's opinion largely focused
on the fundamental principles of medical malpractice and the ap-
plicability of circumstantial evidence through the doctrine res ipsa
loquitur.26 Justice Newman began the court's analysis by broadly
defining medical malpractice as "the unwarranted departure from
generally accepted standards of medical practice resulting in in-
jury to a patient."27 Elementally, to succeed in a medical malprac-
tice action, Justice Newman stated that "a plaintiff must establish
1) a duty owed by the physician to the patient, 2) a breach of that
duty by the physician, 3) that the breach was the proximate cause
of the harm suffered, and 4) that the damages suffered were a di-
rect result of the harm."2' According to the court, laypeople do not
normally comprehend what acts may constitute physician negli-
gence, and in view of this, a plaintiff must present expert testi-
mony to establish the above mentioned elements.29
22. See Brief for Appellee at 8.
23. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1142.
24. Id. The Rogal Defendants argued that the Superior Court incorrectly stated that
the Dead Man's Act was the only basis for Dr. Stone's summary judgment motion. Joint
Brief for Appellants at 8. Specifically, according to the Rogal Defendants, the Superior
Court overlooked the fact that Dr. Stone's motion for summary judgment was also brought
due to a lack of expert testimony. Id.
25. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1151. Justice Newman authored the majority opinion, and
Justices Castille and Saylor concurred in the result. Id. at 1140. Justice Nigro filed a
dissenting opinion, and Former Chief Justice Zappala did not participate in the decision of
this case. Id. at 1151 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1145-50 (explaining that because the negligence of a physician encompasses
matters not within the ordinary knowledge and experience of laypersons, a medical mal-
practice plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of
care, the deviation from that standard, causation and the extent of the injury); See also
Hightower- Warren, 698 A.2d at 54.
27. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145 (citing Hodgson v. Bigelow, 7 A.2d 338 (Pa. 1939)).
28. Id. (citing Hightower-Warren, 698 A.2d at 54).
29. Id. (citing Hightower- Warren, 698 A.2d at 54). In medical malpractice actions the
plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish that the physician's care and treatment
of the plaintiff fell short of the required standard of care, and that the shortcoming caused
the injury. See id. at 1145.
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The majority did identify an exception to the requirement of ex-
pert testimony; however, the exception only applies to simple mat-
ters that clearly demonstrate a lack of care or a lack of skill, fal-
ling within a non-professional's scope of understanding.' Accord-
ing to the court, the doctrine's foundation consists of a jury's com-
mon sense understanding of pertinent facts that could create an
inference of negligence. 31 Discussing the doctrine's relationship to
medical malpractice, the court noted that due to the demand for
highly technical evidence, res ipsa loquitur was not historically
applicable to medical malpractice actions. 2 However, the court
stated that with the adoption of Section 328D of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, claimants could recover in medical malpractice
actions on a res ipsa loquitur theory due to Section 328D's broad
scope.33 Specifically, Justice Newman noted that Section 328D's
design was capable of invoking "all instances where negligence
could be inferred in a proper manner.'
Justice Newman also mentioned that despite Pennsylvania's
adoption of Section 328D, expert testimony, to determine a physi-
cian's standard of care, is still required in the majority of actions
involving medical negligence to determine a physician's standard
of care. 35 To determine if a physician breached a duty of care to a
patient, the court adopted a two-step process. 36 First, the majority
stated that a determination must be made with regard to the
30. Id. at 1145. An example of a simple matter that clearly demonstrates a lack of care
are the "sponge left in patient" cases. Id. at 1147. The court noted that injury alone is
insufficient to prove medical negligence. Id. at 1146 Specifically, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur cannot be used simply because a treatment caused injury or failed to yield the
expected outcome. Id.
31. Id.
32. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1147.
33. Id. at 1148. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
34. Id. (citing Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital, 437 A.2d 1134 (Pa. 1981)).
35. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1148-49. Section 328D states:
1. It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence of
the defendant when:
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of neg-
ligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff.
2. It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference may reasonably
be drawn by the jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn.
3. It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to be drawn in
any case where different conclusions may reasonably be reached.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
36. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1149.
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standard of care bound to the physician's actions, and second,
whether the physician's conduct closely paralleled that standard.37
The court mentioned that these findings must be derived from ex-
pert medical testimony at trial, made by physicians testifying as
expert witnesses.3' According to the court, Section 328D requires
three overarching conditions to be satisfied for res ipsa loquitur to
apply.39 First, a layperson, based on their common knowledge, or
an expert's testimony, based on their experience and training,
must be able to determine that the outcome of a physician's ac-
tions do not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.4 ° Sec-
ond, the instrumentality which caused the harm must have been
exclusively controlled by the physician.4' Lastly, Justice Newman
stated that the evidence offered must be sufficient to satisfy the
causal connection between the physician's actions and the damage
realized by the patient.42
When this analysis was applied to the facts of the case, the
court found that to correctly evaluate a physician's decision to
administer paravertebral nerve block injections in a particular
43location, a juror's analysis should be founded on expert opinion.
Specifically, the majority recognized that the reasonableness of a
physician's decision is most accurately scrutinized by the adminis-
tering physician's peer group." Justice Newman stated it was "es-
sential to Toogood's claim to introduce expert testimony" because
the performance of a "paravertebral nerve block involves complex
issues of anatomy, medical science, invasive procedures, and pre-
cision performance." 5
The court also stressed the importance of limiting res ipsa loqui-
tur inferences in medical negligence actions due to three general
37. Id. By means of expert testimony, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
physician did not possess and employ the required skill and knowledge, or did not exercise
the care and judgment of a reasonable professional. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1149-50.
40. Id. at 1150.
41. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1150.
42. Id.
43. Id. Justice Newman stated that for the jury to have made an intelligent analysis
regarding the paravertebral nerve block injections, they needed to understand the skills
required in isolating a specific location to give the injection, and the likelihood of giving the
injection in an unintended location. Id.
44. Id. "The cause and effect of a physical condition lies in a field of knowledge in
which only a medical expert can give a competent opinion .... Without experts we feel
that the jury could have no basis other than conjecture, surmise or speculation upon which
to consider causation." Id. (quoting Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 523 (N.M. 1962)).
45. Toogood, 824 A.2d. at 1150.
400 Vol. 42
public policy concerns.4' First, due to a societal dependency on
physicians, in terms of providing quality health care and ensuring
the survival of the human race, "society should not be allowed to
second-guess a physician's actions without a clear understanding
of the standards required." 7 Second, due to the malleable nature
of medical medicine, the discretion a physician is permitted when
treating a patient should not be subject to retrospective scrutiny.48
Lastly, Justice Newman noted that due to the "complex and ex-
perimental" nature of medicine, expert testimony is a necessity to
circumvent findings of liability based on simple mistake of judg-
41ment or accidental occurrence.
Dissenting from the majority, Justice Nigro largely focused on
the inferences stemming from Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec-
tion 328D comment (e).5" Specifically, Justice Nigro stated that
despite the complexities that may exist when a paravertebral
nerve block injection is administered, the application of res ipsa
loquitur to the facts of this case should not be ruled out.5' Justice
Nigro noted that the three overarching elements, as stated by the
majority, were satisfied, and that Toogood could proceed in the
absence of expert testimony regarding the appropriate standard of
52care.
Justice Nigro's liberal application of res ipsa loquitur mirrors its
historical foundation when placed in a common knowledge con-
text.53 Broadly stated, the everyday experiences that each of us
46. See Id. at 1151.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Karyn K. Ablin, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Expert Opinion Evidence in
Medical Malpractice Cases: Strange Bedfellows, 82 VA.L. REV. 325,353-55 (March 1996)).
50. See Toogood, 824 A-2d at 1152 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Section 328D, cmt. (e) states:
The plaintiffs burden of proof (see § 328A) requires him to produce evidence which
will permit the conclusion that it is more likely than not that his injuries were caused
by the defendant's negligence. Where the probabilities are at best evenly divided be-
tween negligence and its absence, it becomes the duty of the court to direct the jury
that there is no sufficient proof. The plaintiff need not, however, conclusively exclude
all other possible explanations, and so prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such proof is not required in civil actions, in contrast to criminal cases. It is enough
that the facts proved reasonably permit the conclusion that negligence is the more
probable explanation. This conclusion is not for the court to draw, or to refuse to
draw, in any case where either conclusion is reasonable and even though the court
would not itself find negligence, it must still leave the question to the jury if reason-
able men might do so.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. (e) (1965).
51. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1152.
52. Id. at 1152-53.
53. Id. Justice Nigro noted that it is common knowledge that the giving and receiving
of injections ordinarily does not result in nerve injury. Id.
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encounter create a wealth of obviously known facts, which can
sometimes afford a stronger understanding than even an expert
witnesses could provide. 4 Chief Baron Pollock, former exchequer
judge, coined the term res ipsa loquitur in an 1863 case that in-
volved a barrel of flour that rolled out of a second story warehouse
window and fell upon a passing pedestrian." In Byrne v. Boadle,
the defendant's alleged negligence was at issue; however, no evi-
dence was available to connect the defendant or his servants with
the accident.56 Concluding that the defendant was negligent, Chief
Baron Pollock simply stated that the occurrence of the accident
spoke for itself, and that the need for direct evidence was over-
shadowed by the circumstantial evidence that created a strong
inferential link to negligence.
The parameters of res ipsa loquitur were refined two years later
in the factually similar case of Scott v. The London & St. Cath-
erine Docks Co.5" The plaintiff in Scott, a customs officer, was
bruised and permanently injured when six bags of sugar fell from
a crane that was operating in the defendant's warehouse.59 The
majority in Scott set forth a two prong test to be used if the plain-
tiff cannot produce reasonable evidence of a negligent act." Ac-
cording to the court, it must be shown that 1) the defendant had
management and control over the act, and 2) the act would not
have arisen unless proper care and management were absent."
Given the satisfaction of both prongs, the majority noted that an
accident alone would provide reasonable evidence of negligence.62
In Pennsylvania, the formulation of res ipsa loquitur was fur-
ther refined in Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., due to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec-
54. Schaffner v. Cumberland County Hosp. System, 336 S.E.2d 116, 118 (N.C. 1985).
55. Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 243 (W. Page Keeton ed., West Group 5th ed. 1984) (1941)
(citing Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 299 (1863)).
56. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep at 299. See also VICTORIA E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER,
WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 229-32 (Robert C. Clark ed., Foundation Press 10th ed. 2000)
(1951).
57. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 301. Chief Baron Pollock stated that the presumption of
negligence shifted to the defendants based on the strength of the circumstantial evidence,
and if facts do exist inconsistent with negligence, it is the defendant's job to prove them.
Id.
58. 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (1865).
59. Id. at 665-66.
60. Id. The majority view in Scott was held by Cropton, J., Byles, J., Blackburn, J., and
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tion 328D. 61 In Gilbert, a three-year-old boy lost part of his left big
toe while riding on an escalator in Korvette's department store. '
A negligence action was brought against Korvette's Inc., and Otis
Elevator Co., and the case was subsequently submitted to the jury
with a res ipsa loquitur instruction.65 The jury found both defen-
dants guilty, and each defendant appealed to the Superior Court.66
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the application of res
ipsa loquitur as to Korvette's, but found that the doctrine was in-
correctly applied to the Otis Elevator Co.67 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court's finding, agreeing that
the trial court erred by utilizing a res ipsa loquitur instruction,
and solidified the doctrine's purpose by adopting Section 328D.65
To lay a foundation for the adoption of 328D, the court discussed
how the availability and effect of res ipsa loquitur, prior to the
adoption of Section 328D, became confused and misused in Penn-
sylvania due to the states' use of conflicting rules relating to cir-
cumstantial evidence. 69 First interpreted as a simple evidentiary
rule dealing with the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, Jus-
tice Roberts noted that res ipsa loquitur later became intermin-
gled with concepts relating to burdens of proof.7 ° The court also
noted that the use of res ipsa loquitur as a simple evidentiary rule
became compounded with issues pertaining to the duty component
of a negligence claim.7' More accurately, Justice Roberts stated
that res ipsa loquitur concepts were associated with the substan-
tive issue of a defendant's control over the alleged negligent act,
which was directly connected to a defendant's duty.7 2 According to
63. 327 A.2d 94 (Pa. 1975). See also supra note 35.





69. Gilbert, 327 A.2d. at 96-97.
70. Id. at 97. The court cites Christie v. Griggs, 170 Eng. Rep. 1088 (N.P. 1809), a case
in which passengers suffered injuries at the hands of a common carrier. Id. The carrier
had the burden of proving their conformity with the standard of care owed to the passen-
gers. Id. See also § 328D cmt. (a) RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
71. Gilbert, 327 A.2d at 97.
72. Id. According to the court in Gilbert, the confusion led Pennsylvania courts to re-
strict the use of res ipsa loquitur to cases which the defendant owed the plaintiff the high-
est degree of care. Id. This usually included owners and operators of common carriers such
as elevators and escalators. Id. See also Alexander v. Nanticoke Light Co., 58 A. 1068 (Pa.
1904); Ambrose v. Western Md. Ry., 81 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1951); McKnight v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
132 A. 575 (Pa. 1926) (explaining the narrow application of res ipsa loquitur due to the
confused evolution and application of the doctrine in Pennsylvania).
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the court in Gilbert, the meaning of res ipsa loquitur became diffi-
cult to consistently apply in Pennsylvania due to the confusion
among the evidentiary, substantive, and procedural issues raised
by the various understandings of the once simple concept. 3 In
Pennsylvania, according to the Supreme Court, the confusion per-
taining to res ipsa loquitur manifested itself in three companion
doctrines of circumstantial proof.74 The doctrines consisted of the
simple definition of res ipsa loquitur as defined by Chief Barron
Pollock, exclusive control, and an untitled evidentiary rule of sim-
ple circumstantial evidence.75
In Gilbert, the court recognized the need to consolidate and re-
place the use of the three companion doctrines with the American
Law Institute's more logical formulation of res ipsa loquitur evi-
denced in Section 328D.76 According to the court in Gilbert, the
adoption of Section 328D eliminated both the need for distinctions
to be made regarding substantive duties and decisions regarding
exclusive management or control by the defendant.77 In theory,
Pennsylvania's adoption of Section 328D simplified matters deal-
ing with circumstantial evidence, and allowed the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to be applied to a range of issues consistently, includ-
ing medical malpractice.
Broadly defined, medical malpractice encompasses unacceptable
deviations from recognized treatments, diagnoses or acts by a
physician that result in injury to a patient." As Justice Newman
mentioned in Toogood, medicine is not an exact science, and as a
result, res ipsa loquitur has had a limited historical role in medi-
cal malpractice cases.79 In Toogood, Justice Newman also noted
that if res ipsa loquitur were to apply to a medical malpractice
case, then expert testimony as to the standard of a physician's
73. Gilbert, 327 A-2d at 97.
74. Id. at 99.
75. Id. at 98. The court in Gilbert stated that cases that use the formula of exclusive
control have added a number of arbitrary requirements, which stray from the evidentiary
purpose behind res ipsa loquitur. Id. See also Izzi v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 195 A.2d
784, 788 (1963).
76. Id. at 99. The court's adoption of § 328D marked a large departure from Pennsyl-
vania's common law, and recognized res ipsa loquitur as only a rule of evidence connecting
circumstantial evidence to negligence. Id.
77. Id. at 101. The court in Gilbert noted that the inquiry is not control but whether a
particular defendant is the responsible cause of the injury. Id.
78. Hodgson v. Bigelow, 7 A.2d 338 (Pa. 1939).
79. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1146-47.
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care would be essential to make a determination of fault.8s Spe-
cifically, Justice Newman stated that courts must follow a two-
step process, including an initial determination as to a physician's
specific standard of care, and secondly, whether the physician's
conduct paralleled that standard." In Pennsylvania, given the
presence of expert testimony, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has
been applied to medical malpractice cases due to the potential for
abuse stemming from medical camaraderie, also known as the
"conspiracy of silence."" Res ipsa loquitur has also been applied to
the increasingly common occurrence of many surgical procedures. 3
In 1981, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first subjected the
medical profession to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Jones v.
Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital,s despite the doctrine's fundamen-
tal disagreement with the then current state-wide medical mal-
practice law. 5 In Jones, the plaintiff underwent a laparotomy to
correct potential gynecological problems.8 After the procedure,
the plaintiff suffered intense pain in her neck, left shoulder and
left arm, and was ultimately diagnosed as having suprascapular
nerve palsy.87 The plaintiff asserted a liability action against the
defendant surgeon, Dr. Beittel, for lack of informed consent and
negligence, via the application of res ipsa loquitur.s The jury
found for the plaintiff based only on the inferential negligence
claim, and Dr. Beittel subsequently appealed.89 In Jones, the
80. Id. at 1149. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Chandler v. Cook, 265 A.2d
794, 796 (Pa. 1970), held that a jury will not be permitted to find negligence in the absence
of expert testimony to establish a deviation from accepted medical practices. See Cook, 265
A.2d at 796.
81. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1149.
82. Salgo v. Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). Tradi-
tionally, it was almost impossible to get a physician to testify against another physician in
litigation, even if the acting physician's treatments were obviously negligent. Id. As a
result, a negligent physician could escape from civil liability. Id. Furthermore, no steps
would be taken to eliminate future occurrences of similar problems. Id.
83. Id. at 175. The court in Salgo noted that due to major developments in medical
science, procedures that would have seemed impracticable and fatal in the past, such as
heart surgery, are being utilized successfully on a consistent basis today. Id.
84. 437 A.2d 1134 (Pa. 1981).
85. Id. at 1137.
86. Id. at 1135. A laparotomy can be defined as a surgical opening of the abdomen to
examine intra-abdominal contents. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIoNARY, 966 (27th ed.
2000).
87. Jones, 437 A.2d at 1136. The suprascapular nerve palsy was allegedly caused by
the malpositioning of the plaintiffs arm during the procedure. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The jury did not accept the plaintiffs lack of informed consent theory when
finding for the plaintiff. Id. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court's
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis of res ipsa loquitur was
based on their earlier adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 328D, which consists of a three-pronged test." The court
stated that Section 328D, used as an evidentiary rule, relates to
factual scenarios that demand inferences leaning toward negligent
acts.9 The court in Jones also noted that Section 328D generally
provides two avenues to avoid the production of direct medical
evidence, including reliance on the common knowledge of a juror,
or the reliance on the expertise of a medical professional that the
event would not have occurred without negligence. 9 In Jones, the
Supreme Court utilized the second avenue provided by Section
328D, expert testimony, and affirmed the Superior Court's finding
of negligence.93 According to the court in Jones, a narrow excep-
tion to the expert testimony requirement does exist; however, it is
only applicable to situations that involve an egregious lack of
proper care and skill.94 Such simplistic decisions involve factual
situations that can be grasped fully by lay persons."
In Toogood, the court correctly noted that the medical matter at
issue was not simplistic in nature. On a micro level, Justice
Newman appropriately recognized that for jurors to have fully un-
derstood the standards associated with paravertebral nerve block
injections, an expert should have testified.96 The practical effect of
the court's ruling invariably increases the burden of proof a plain-
findings and granted Dr. Beittel a new trial. Id. Cross appeals were subsequently filed by
both parties. Id.
90. Id. For the text of § 328D, see supra, note 37.
91. Id. at 1138.
92. Jones, 437 A.2d at 1138. The court in Jones relied on cmt. d to Section 328D, which
stated:
In the usual case the basis of past experience from which this conclusion may be
drawn is common to the community and is a matter of general knowledge which the
court recognizes on much the same basis as when it takes judicial notice of facts
which everyone knows. It may, however, be supplied by the evidence of the parties;
and expert testimony that such an event usually does not occur without negligence may
be essential to the plaintiffs case where, as for example in some actions for medical
malpractice, there is no fund of common knowledge which may permit laymen rea-
sonably to draw the conclusion. On the other hand there are other kinds of medical
malpractice, as where a sponge is left in the plaintiffs abdomen after an operation,
where no expert is needed to tell the jury that such events do not usually occur in the
absence of negligence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. d (1965) (emphasis added).
93. Jones, 437 A.2d at 1139. The other two prongs of § 328D were satisfied based on
the expert's testimony that suprascapular nerve palsy does not ordinarily occur during
gynecological procedures absent negligence. Id.
94. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145 (citing Hightower-Warren, 698 A.2d at 54 n.1).
95. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145.
96. Id. at 1149.
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tiffs attorney must meet, even when utilizing the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. This increased burden may directly relate to in-
creased costs for plaintiffs attorneys, which in turn could decrease
the number of warrantless claims, based on a plaintiffs attorney's
fear of not succeeding at trial.
On a macro level, in light of Pennsylvania's medical malpractice
crisis, physicians could deservedly benefit from the decision ren-
dered in Toogood, which in theory solidifies the evidentiary bar in
medical malpractice actions, potentially insulating physicians
from unwarranted claims. Pennsylvania's medical malpractice
crisis, which revolves around the competing interests of medical
groups, plaintiffs attorneys and consumer groups, has created an
unfavorable environment for physicians.9" More specifically, the
crisis is shaped by "medical groups blaming the legal system for
ruling in favor of large damage awards," and plaintiffs attorneys
and consumer groups arguing that "high premiums are purely a
function of investment losses by insurance carriers and substan-
dard medical practice."98 In the aggregate, physicians in Pennsyl-
vania have unfortunately been subjected to an upward trend in
malpractice litigation case filings and payouts since the mid
1990's.99 For example, in 1992, federal officials studied the up-
ward trend in malpractice litigation in both Philadelphia County
and Allegheny County, and found that Allegheny County's rate of
malpractice filings was more then 50% above the national me-
dian.00 Comparatively, Philadelphia County's rate was just over
double the national median.'01 Payments per paid case in Penn-
sylvania have also risen over the past 15 years.0 2 From 1990 to
2001, payouts averaged approximately $300,000; however in 2001,
the average payout increased to $400,000.1°3
Admittedly, these statistics do not paint a complete picture of
the factors contributing to Pennsylvania's medical malpractice
97. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Anna Bartow, Understanding Pennsylvania's Medical Mal-
practice Crisis, The Pew Charitable Trusts (2003), available at
http//www.medliabilitypa.org/research/report06O6/.
98. Id. at 1.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id. at 27-28. (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts, "Tort Cases in Large Counties, 1992," "Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large
Counties, 1996.").
101. Id. at 28.
102. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Anna Bartow, Understanding Pennsylvania's Medical Mal-





crisis. In reality, consensus among researchers is lacking, and as
a result, no identifiable benchmarks have been established in
Pennsylvania that would clearly indicate the direction in which
the healthcare industry is headed. As the medical community re-
leases argument in the form of reports and surveys supporting
their contention that physicians are leaving the state, data re-
leased by the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association simultane-
ously shows a surplus of physicians in Pennsylvania with the po-
tential for growth.0 4 In time, these macro-oriented issues will be
resolved given the discovery and use of criteria agreed upon by all
parties staking a claim in Pennsylvania's medical industry. Until
then, decisions such as Toogood, though based solely on the merits
of the arguments presented to the court, can be used to abate the
identifiable and objective harms physicians could face absent evi-
dentiary safeguards."'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Toogood is also
indicative of the substantive malpractice law changes that are oc-
curring, or should occur in Pennsylvania. As Justice Newman
noted, medicine is not an exact science, and as a result, a special-
ized understanding of the subject matter is needed to determine
the merits of a plaintiffs case and the applicable standards of care
associated with a physician's acts."' An example of a substantive
change that incorporates Justice Newman's ideals includes certifi-
cate of merit requirements, which makes a plaintiff certify that a
relevant medical expert has reviewed the claim and deemed it
worthy of litigation prior to the outset of the suit.0 7 Most medical
malpractice specialists already adhere to this procedure; however,
for the non-specialist plaintiffs attorneys, this reform could help
to reduce unwarranted claims. Another substantive change in-
volves the implementation of medical screening panels that are
partially or entirely comprised of physicians that could render an
opinion on the liability of the respective physician.' In theory,
the use of screening panels could also decrease unwarranted mal-
practice claims.
104. Christopher Guadagnino, Physician Shortage in Pennsylvania (2003), available at
http://www.physiciannews.com/cover/803.html.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
106. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1151.
107. Catherine T. Struve, Expertise in Medical Malpractice Litigation, Special Courts,
Screening Panels and Other Options 2 , The Pew Charitable Trusts (2003), available at
http://www.medliability.org/research.
108. Id. at 3-4.
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The fundamental commonality that runs through every conceiv-
able reform can be traced back to the inherent risk associated with
every procedure a doctor performs. In Toogood, Justice Newman
noted that "[t]he art of healing frequently calls for a balancing of
risks and dangers to a patient."109 Physicians are well-respected
due to both their extensive training, and ability to minimize the
fears of their patients; however, because physicians are human,
mistakes are inevitable. This inevitability, however, may not fully
be understood by non-medical professionals, and as a result a need
for expert testimony explaining which standard of care to apply is
necessary for fair outcomes and medical advancements.
Generally, for medical advancements to occur, physicians need
to be protected when they decide to forge new ground in the con-
text of research or prescribed treatments. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court recognized these overarching principles, and should
be commended for both an accurate legal analysis, and an indirect
yet insightful glimpse into the fears that can unfortunately ac-
company the decisions made by each physician in Pennsylvania on
a daily basis.
Justin J. Landfair
109. Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1150.
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